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This essay discusses the policy debate concerning optimal taxation and the distribution of income.
It begins with a brief overview of trends in income inequality, the leading hypothesis to explain these
trends, and the distribution of the tax burden.  It then considers the framework that economists use
to address the normative problem of designing tax systems.  The conventional utilitarian approach
is found to be wanting, as it leads to prescriptions that conflict with many individuals’ moral intuitions.
The essay then explores an alternative normative framework, dubbed the Just Deserts Theory, according














One of my favorite recent moments in political theater was when “Joe the Plumber” 
posed a question to candidate Barack Obama during the presidential campaign of 2008.  As you 
may recall, Joe was an aspiring small business owner, and he asked then-Senator Obama about 
his proposal to raise taxes on high-income households.   The candidate responded, in part, “It's 
not that I want to punish your success. I just want to make sure that everybody who is behind 
you, that they've got a chance at success, too…. I think when you spread the wealth around, it’s 
good for everybody.”  
  The reason I like this particular moment is that it focused public attention on one of the 
defining differences among competing economic philosophies.   Indeed, I don’t think it is an 
exaggeration to say that the single most important difference between the political left and the 
political right is over the questions of whether, and to what extent, “spreading the wealth around” 
is a proper function of government.  
  Looking ahead, I fully expect the issue to remain at the center of political debate.  One 
reason is that the tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001 and 2003 will expire next 
year unless Congress takes action to extend them.   
  Another, perhaps more important, reason is that the U.S. federal government is running a 
large budget deficit and faces an ominous fiscal gap looming on the horizon.  As the baby boom 
generation retires and starts claiming Social Security and Medicare, government spending will 
slowly and steadily continue to rise as a share of the economy.  It is possible that Congress will 
suddenly read Milton Friedman’s book Capitalism and Freedom, become committed classical 
liberals (in the 19







government.  But, more likely, Congress will find past entitlement promises hard to break, and 
so it will have little choice but to raise taxes to levels unprecedented in U.S. history.   
  Which naturally raises the question: Whose taxes should go up? 
  I should say at the outset that the issues I will discuss with you here involve not only 
economics but also some political philosophy.   Because I am not a political philosopher by 
training, I hope you will forgive me if my occasional philosophical ruminations seem like those 
of an amateur.   If I am right that the issue of redistributive justice will be at the heart of the 
coming policy debate, it will be hard to leave the topic to the philosophical experts.  And in light 
of the inextricable linkages between philosophy and economics that characterize this topic, I 
hope it is possible that those experts might learn something from humble economists like me. 
 
Facts about the Income Distribution 
  A good place to start in thinking about this issue (and many others) is with the facts.  One 
reason that President Obama and Joe the Plumber were focused on “spreading the wealth” is that 
the distribution of income has changed dramatically over the past few decades.  So let’s start our 
discussion not with political philosophy but on the firmer ground of economic statistics. 
  Figure 1 is taken from my Harvard colleagues Claudia Goldin and Larry Katz (2007).  
The figure uses census data for two time periods to show the growth in income for the five 







  For the early period, from 1947 to 1973, the bars all have about the same height.  That is, 
all income groups experienced growth of about 2 to 3 percent per year.  There is, however, some 
variation.  Because the bottom quintile had the highest average growth rate and the top quintile 
had the lowest, the overall income distribution became more compressed. 
  After 1973, however, this trend reversed itself, as the average growth rates for low-
income groups were markedly below those for higher income groups.   For the top 5 percent, the 
average growth rate continued at about 2 percent per year.  For the lowest quintile, the average 
growth rate has been approximately zero.  This fact explains why U.S. poverty rates, after a long 
period of decline, have remained largely unchanged over the past couple decades. 
  Another source that documents the recent widening in the income distribution is data 
from tax returns, as has been extensively studied by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez (2003).    
I should point out that tax return data are highly imperfect for this purpose, as changes in the tax 
code over time can alter the incentive to receive and report income in any particular form.  For 
example, the tax law influences the choice many small businesses make about whether to 
organize as a C-corporation or as an S-corporation, and this decision in turn influences where 
their income appears in tax data.  Nonetheless, despite this problem, the tax data may be our best 
lens into the lives of the truly rich. 
  Figure 2 shows the percentage of total income received by the top 1 percent of the 
income distribution.  To get into this group today, your household has to make more than 
$400,000 a year.  As the figure illustrates, the share of income accruing to this group has more 







  Figure 3 shows the income share of an even more elite group—the top 1 percent of the 
top 1 percent.  To get into this group, your family needs annual income of more than $11 million.  
Since the mid-1970s, this group’s share of total income has increased about sixfold.  
  So those are the facts about the changing income distribution.  While one can argue to 
some degree about their reliability, they are probably the least controvertible things I am going to 
address in this essay.  
 
Why is Inequality Growing? 
  The natural next question to address, at least for an economist, is why such changes in the 
income distribution have been occurring. 
  The best diagnosis so far comes from Goldin and Katz in their recent book The Race 
Between Education and Technology.  Their bottom line is that “the sharp rise in inequality was 
largely due to an educational slowdown.” 
  According to Goldin and Katz, for the past century technological progress has been a 
steady force not only increasing average living standards, but also increasing the demand for 
skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. Skilled workers are needed to apply and manage 
new technologies, while less skilled workers are more likely to become obsolete. 
  For much of the 20th century, however, skill-biased technological change was outpaced 







the demand for skilled workers, our educational system increased the supply of them even faster. 
As a result, skilled workers did not benefit disproportionately from economic growth. 
  But recently things have changed. Over the last several decades, technological advance 
has kept up its pace, while educational advancement has slowed down. The cohort of workers 
born in 1950 averaged 4.67 more years of schooling than the cohort born in 1900, representing 
an increase of 0.93 years of schooling in each decade. By contrast, the cohort born in 1975 had 
only 0.74 more years of schooling than that born in 1950, an increase of only 0.30 years per 
decade.   That is, the pace of educational advance has fallen by 68 percent. 
  Because growth in the supply of skilled workers has slowed, their wages have grown 
relative to those of the unskilled. This is evident in Goldin and Katz’s estimates of the financial 
return to education. In 1980, each year of college raised a person’s wage by 7.6 percent. In 2005, 
each year of college yielded an additional 12.9 percent. Over this time period, the rate of return 
from each year of graduate school has risen even more — from 7.3 to 14.2 percent. 
  While education is the key to understanding broad inequality trends, it is less obvious 
whether it can help explain the incomes of the superrich. Simply going to college and graduate 
school is hardly enough to join the top echelons making millions a year. 
  But neither is education irrelevant.   We don’t know much about the demographic 
characteristics of the superrich, but it is a good bet that they are on average highly educated.  A 








  Perhaps advanced degrees are like Willie Wonka’s famous chocolate bars. A few of them 
come with golden tickets that give you opportunities almost beyond imagination.   Over the past 
several decades, as the return to education has increased, the value of those golden tickets has 
increased as well.  But even if you aren’t lucky enough to get a golden ticket, you can still enjoy 
the chocolate, which by itself is well worth the price. 
 
Facts about the Tax Burden 
  All the numbers I have shown you so far describe before-tax incomes.   But these facts 
are clearly related to the public debate over tax policy.  If policymakers want to change the 
distribution of economic well-being, the federal system of taxes and transfers is the most direct 
and arguably most powerful tool they have. 
   There is no doubt that these facts are politically charged.  The question, “Do the rich pay 
their fair share in taxes?” is one of defining issues of our time.   One way we can start thinking 
about this question is by looking at how much people in different parts of the income distribution 
pay. 
During the presidential campaign of 2008, at a fund-raiser for Hillary Clinton, the 
billionaire investor Warren E. Buffett said that rich guys like him weren’t paying enough.  Mr. 
Buffett asserted that his taxes in the previous year equaled only 17.7 percent of his taxable 







Mr. Buffett was echoing a refrain that is popular in some circles. A few years ago, Robert 
B. Reich, labor secretary during the Clinton administration, wrote on his blog that “middle-
income workers are now paying a larger share of their incomes than people at or near the 
top….We have turned the principle of a graduated, progressive tax on its head.” 
These claims are enough to get populist juices flowing—which perhaps was the 
motivation for them. The problem is that these assertions don’t hold up under close examination. 
The best source for objective data on the distribution of the tax burden is the 
Congressional Budget Office. The C.B.O. goes beyond anecdotes and bald assertions to provide 
hard data on who pays taxes. One can argue about some aspects of its methodology, but there is 
no doubt that it is nonpartisan and that its tax analysts are some of the best in the business. 
The C.B.O.’s calculations of federal tax rates, displayed in Table 1, show a highly 
progressive system. (The numbers are based on 2006 data, the most recent year available, but the 
tax code has not changed much since then.) The poorest fifth of the population, with average 
annual income of $17,200, pays only 4.3 percent of its income in federal taxes. The middle fifth, 
with income of $60,700, pays 14.2 percent. And the top fifth, with income of $248,400, pays 
25.8 percent.  
For the very top of the income distribution, the C.B.O. reports even higher tax rates. The 
richest 1 percent, with an average income of $1,743,700, forks over 31.2 percent of its income to 







One might wonder how Mr. Buffett gets away with a tax rate of only 17.7 percent, while 
a typical millionaire is paying so much more. Most likely, part of the answer is that Mr. Buffett’s 
income is made up largely of dividends and capital gains, which are taxed at only 15 percent. By 
contrast, many other top earners pay the maximum ordinary income tax rate of 35 percent on 
their salaries, bonuses, and business income. 
The distinction is crucial for understanding how much the rich pay. Indeed, the share of 
top incomes coming from capital is much lower now than it has been historically. According to 
the Piketty and Saez data, for the very richest Americans — those in the top 0.01 percent of the 
distribution — the percentage of income derived from capital fell from 71 percent in 1929 to 33 
percent in 2007.   If your image of the typical rich person is someone who collects interest and 
dividend checks and spends long afternoons relaxing on his yacht, you are decades out of date. 
The leisure class has been replaced by the working rich. 
Another piece of the puzzle is that Mr. Buffett’s tax burden is larger than it first appears, 
because he is a major shareholder in Berkshire Hathaway.  When the C.B.O. studies the tax 
burden, it includes all federal taxes, including individual income taxes, payroll taxes, and 
corporate income taxes. In its analysis, payroll taxes are borne by workers, and corporate taxes 
by the owners of capital. For the richest 1 percent of the population, 10.4 percentage points of 
their 31.2 percent tax rate comes from the taxes that corporations have paid on their behalf. The 
corporate tax would undoubtedly loom large if the C.B.O. were to calculate Mr. Buffett’s 







So it is simply wrong to say we don’t have a progressive tax system.  The best analysis 
shows that average federal tax rates rise steeply with income. 
None of these calculations, however, say whether the rich are paying their fair share.  At 
the 2000 Republican National Convention, candidate George W. Bush stated clearly his view: 
“On principle, no one in America should have to pay more than a third of their income to the 
federal government.” As judged by the C.B.O. data, he accomplished his goal.  Eight years later, 
during the campaign of 2008, candidate Barack Obama made clear that he thought the rich 
weren’t paying enough.  And if his proposed policies become law in the coming years, the 
richest Americans will end up paying over a third of their income in federal taxes. 
What I want to do now is turn to the question of how we might begin to evaluate these 
alternative points of view.  So far, most of what I have said here has safely fallen within the 
realm of positive economics.  I now want to examine the framework for the normative analysis 
of redistribution. 
 
Agnosticism and Utilitarianism 
  Here is the question I would like to consider: What can economists contribute to the 
policy debate over inequality and the distribution of the tax burden? 
  One plausible answer is, not much.  It is tempting to take the position that the optimal 
redistribution of income is really a question only for political philosophers.  We economists can 







with attempts to achieve more equality.  But in the end, picking the best point on the tradeoff 
between efficiency and equality comes from policy preferences about which we, as economists, 
must be agnostic. 
  The academic literature on optimal taxation, however, takes a different tack.  Rather than 
remaining agnostic, work in this area adopts a particular philosophical perspective—
utilitarianism.  (See, e.g., Mirrlees, 1971.)  That is, it is assumed not only that individuals 
maximize their own utility (the standard assumption in microeconomics), but that society should 
choose a tax-and-transfer policy to maximize the sum of utility over all individuals (or perhaps a 
more complicated, nonlinear social welfare function of individual utilities). 
  For economists, this approach is quite natural.  One reason is that utilitarians and 
economists share an intellectual tradition.  The early utilitarians, such as John Stuart Mill, were 
also among the early economists.   Another reason is that utilitarianism seems to be a simple and 
natural extension of the economist’s model of individual decision-making to the societal level.   
Moreover, utilitarian political philosophy allows economists to use the tools of analysis we find 
useful in many other contexts.  Running a society becomes a problem of constrained 
optimization.  
  Nonetheless, the utilitarian approach is fraught with several problems.   One classic 
problem is the interpersonal comparability of utility.  We can infer an individual’s utility 
function from his choices.  But from this revealed-preference perspective, utility is not inherently 







  Philosophers entertain other objections to utilitarianism.  Undergraduate philosophy 
courses are filled with hypothetical examples to test the limits of this perspective.  In a classic 
example, you are standing on a bridge over some trolley tracks, and you see an out-of-control 
trolley car hurtling toward three innocent children.  There is, however, a fat man standing next to 
you, and you can save the three children by pushing the fat man off the bridge and onto the 
tracks below.  (You are assumed to be too thin to save the children by throwing yourself off the 
bridge.)  The question is, would you kill the fat man to save the children?   A utilitarian would 
have no trouble doing so, but many people are left uncomfortable with that conclusion. 
  These kinds of examples can be greatly entertaining, but I am skeptical of their practical 
usefulness.  Testing the implications of theories against our moral intuitions makes sense, but I 
am wary of hypothetical examples so far outside of any actual experience.  Maybe we resist 
pushing the fat man not because we reject utilitarianism but because the facts of the case are too 
outlandish to take seriously. I for sure have never found myself standing on a bridge with the 
certain knowledge that I could sacrifice a fat man and save three innocent children. To evaluate 
whether we really believe utilitarianism, it might be better to consider actions or policies that we 
might actually be in a position to implement. 
 
Utilitarianism on a Global Scale 
  Let me propose a somewhat less graphic hypothetical.  Imagine a candidate for president 







transferring the entire proceeds of the tax to poor nations around the world.   Would you be 
inclined to support this candidate? 
  I am confident that most voters would not.  I say this because I know of no political 
candidate who has proposed something even remotely like this.  Moreover, the foreign aid that 
the United States does provide to the world’s poor is far smaller than this and, even so, tends to 
be wildly unpopular.  Even proponents of increased foreign aid, such as Jeff Sachs, would not 
have the temerity to suggest sending a third of our GDP abroad. 
  But if we were truly utilitarian in our policy design, why not?  According to utilitarian 
logic, we impose tax rates of one-third or more on the residents of Palm Beach, Florida, and 
Greenwich, Connecticut, because they are richer and therefore have lower marginal utility than 
the average American.  By the same logic, however, the average American is vastly richer than 
the average citizen of the world and should, therefore, have lower marginal utility.   
  The logic of utilitarianism as a theory of justice provides no reason to give a special role 
to national boundaries.  If this political philosophy gives the moral authority to the federal 
government to tax rich Americans for the benefit of poorer Americans, it should authorize the 
United Nations to impose similar tax rates on rich nations such as the United States for the 
benefit of poorer nations. 
  My guess, however, is that most supporters of progressive taxation within the United 








The Optimal Taxation of Height 
  Let me give you another example of how utilitarianism leads to policy conclusions about 
which many people are uncomfortable.  This one is based on recent work I have done with 
Matthew Weinzierl (2010). 
More than a century ago, Francis Y. Edgeworth (1897) pointed out that a utilitarian social 
planner with full information will be completely egalitarian. More specifically, the planner will 
equalize the marginal utility of all members of society; if everyone has the same separable 
preferences, equalizing marginal utility requires equalizing after-tax incomes as well. Those 
endowed with greater than average productivity are fully taxed on the excess, and those endowed 
with lower than average productivity are subsidized to bring them up to the average. 
William S. Vickrey (1945) and James A. Mirrlees (1971) emphasized a key practical 
difficulty with Edgeworth’s solution. The government cannot observe innate productivity. 
Instead, it observes income, which is a function of productivity and effort. The social planner 
with such imperfect information has to limit his utilitarian desire for the egalitarian outcome, 
recognizing that too much redistribution will blunt incentives to supply effort. The Vickrey-
Mirrlees approach to optimal nonlinear taxation is now standard in the academic literature on 
public finance. 
Vickrey and Mirrlees assumed that income was the only piece of data the government 
could observe about an individual. That assumption, however, is far from true. In practice, a 
person’s income tax liability is a function of many variables beyond income, such as mortgage 







George Akerlof (1978) called these variables “tags” and suggested that they might be used to 
identify individuals whom society deems worthy of special support. 
In a recent paper, Weinzierl and I used the Vickrey-Mirrlees utilitarian framework to 
explore the potential role of another variable – the taxpayer’s height. This inquiry is supported by 
two legs, one theoretical and one empirical. 
The theoretical leg is that, according to the theory of optimal taxation, any exogenous 
variable correlated with productivity should be a useful indicator for determining an individual’s 
optimal tax liability. Intuitively, such a variable allows society to tax its more productive 
members, on average, without incurring the efficiency costs that come with taxing income. 
The empirical leg is that a person’s height is strongly correlated with his or her income. 
For example, Anne Case and Christina Paxson (2008) report that "for both men and women...an 
additional inch of height [is] associated with a one to two percent increase in earnings." This 
fact, together with the canonical approach to optimal taxation, suggests that a person’s tax 
liability should be a function of his height. That is, a tall person of a given income should pay 
more in taxes than a short person of the same income. 
My recent research with Weinzierl shows that, according to a conventional utilitarian 
calculus, the optimal height levy is sizeable. We calculate optimal taxes for adult white males in 
the United States, whom we divide into three height groups – tall (above 72 inches), medium 
(between 70 and 72 inches), and short (below 70 inches). The optimal average tax on the tall is 
about 7.1% of average tall income, while the average tax on the medium is about 3.8% of 
average medium income. These taxes pay for an average transfer to the short of more than 13% 







schedule by height group. According to this standard utilitarian model, a tall person making 
$50,000 should pay about $4,500 more in taxes than a short person making the same income. 
Many people, however, will not quickly embrace the idea of levying higher taxes on tall 
taxpayers. Indeed, when first hearing the proposal, most people either recoil or express 
amusement. That reaction is precisely what makes the policy so intriguing. A tax on height 
follows inexorably from the standard utilitarian approach to the optimal design of tax policy 
coupled with a well-established empirical regularity. If we reject the conclusion, we must 
reconsider the assumptions. 
 
Just Deserts  
  Unlike pushing the fat man off the bridge, the two policies I just considered are ones that 
we could actually implement if we wanted to.  The United States could turn over a third of our 
GDP to the world’s poorer nations, and the U.S. Congress could pass a sizeable tax based on 
height.  My guess, however, is that relatively few people would endorse these two policies with 
enthusiasm.  There are many possible reasons why this might be the case, but what I would like 
to propose is that our moral intuitions are not, fundamentally, utilitarian.   
  Among philosophers, there is a long tradition of rejecting utilitarianism and similar 
approaches to distributive justice.  Robert Nozick wrote the following in his famous 1974 book 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia: 
  We are not in the position of children who have been given portions of pie by someone who 







distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how 
they are to be doled out.  What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in 
exchange for something, or as a gift.  In a free society, diverse persons control different 
resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary exchanges and actions of persons. 
Despite the prominence of Nozick in general and this book in particular, it is hard to see much 
influence of this philosophical perspective in recent analytic work among economists. 
  Perhaps the reason is that a viable alternative to utilitarianism is far from obvious. That 
is, if we reject utilitarianism as the basis for optimal tax policy, what can economists and other 
policy analysts put in its place as a normative framework? 
  Let me propose the following principle: People should get what they deserve.  A person 
who contributes more to society deserves a higher income that reflects those greater 
contributions.  Society permits him that higher income not just to incentivize him, as it does 
according to utilitarian theory, but because that income is rightfully his.  This perspective is, I 
believe, what Robert Nozick, Milton Friedman, and other classically liberal writers have in mind.  
We might call it the Just Deserts Theory. 
  I am drawn to this approach in part by reflecting on some of the public anger that we see 
over some very high incomes.  My sense is that people are rarely outraged when high incomes go 
to those who obviously earned them.  When we see Steven Spielberg make blockbuster movies, 
Steve Jobs introduce the iPod, David Letterman crack funny jokes, and J.K Rowling excite 
countless young readers with her Harry Potter books, we don’t object to the many millions of 
dollars they earn in the process.   The high incomes that generate anger are those that come from 







banker whose firm survives only by virtue of a government bailout do not seem to deserve their 
multimillion dollar bonuses.  The public perceives them (correctly or incorrectly) as getting more 
than they contributed to society.  That is, if we take public attitudes as a gauge of our innate 
moral intuitions, then in evaluating distributive justice, we should focus not on the marginal 
utility of different individuals but on the congruence between their contributions and their 
compensation. 
  One implication of the Just Deserts Theory is that it gives a new normative interpretation 
of the equilibrium of a competitive market economy.  Under a standard set of assumptions, a 
competitive economy leads to an efficient allocation of resources.  But we economists often say 
that there is nothing particularly equitable about that equilibrium.  Perhaps we are too hasty in 
reaching that judgment.  After all, it is also a standard result that in a competitive equilibrium, 
the factors of production are paid the value of their marginal product.  That is, each person’s 
income reflects the value of what he contributed to society’s production of goods and services.   
One might easily conclude that, under these idealized conditions, each person receives his just 
deserts. 
  Another way to view this claim of the inherent equity of the competitive market 
equilibrium is to consider an exchange economy.  Suppose that nature endows individuals with 
various combinations of goods (which we can view as time and talent), and these individuals 
engage in voluntary and mutually advantageous trade with one another.  From the perspective of 
classical liberalism, it is natural to presume that any individual, or group of individuals, should 
be allowed to leave the large society to live on their own and form smaller communities. They 







do better on their own.  This freedom ensures that the resulting allocation of resources will be in 
what game theorists call the core.  This constraint is significant: Gerard Debreu and Herbert 
Scarf (1963) proved that, as the number of players gets large, the core of such games converges 
to the competitive equilibria.  Thus, if the freedom to exit a society is taken as axiomatic, then 
the only permissible allocations of resources are the competitive market equilibria.  For any other 
allocation, some group will exercise their right to leave because they are not getting their just 
deserts. 
 
Optimal Taxation Revisited   
  Let me now turn to what this approach suggests about the distribution of the tax burden.   
One might be tempted to conclude that if people are earning their just deserts, there is no room 
for a progressive system of taxes and transfers.   One might think it would point us toward a 
system without government, or perhaps lump-sum taxes to finance minimal government, which 
would certainly be a radical departure from current practice.  But I don’t think that is necessarily 
correct.  There are various ways in which the real world differs from a classical competitive 
economy free of market imperfections, and these real-world elements move the Just Deserts 
policy toward what we observe. 
  First of all, Pigovian taxation fits naturally into the Just Deserts Theory.  If a person earns 
income in part by imposing negative externalities on bystanders, there is little doubt that he is 







efficiency, but it also helps align individual compensation with social contribution.  I have long 
advocated increasing the use of Pigovian taxation.  (Mankiw, 2009) 
  Similarly, Pigovian subsidies are a logical implication of the Just Deserts Theory.  If 
some activities, such as the basic research of scientists, exhibit positive externalities, the 
government should help support them.  A corrective subsidy, financed by taxes on the 
beneficiaries of the externality, not only enhances efficiency but also brings individual 
compensation closer to social contribution. 
  Next, there is the issue of public goods, such as national defense, police, and the court 
system.  These expenditures have to be funded somehow, and if people are to get what they 
deserve, these public goods should be paid for by those people who benefit most from them.  In 
their classic work on the financing of public goods, Knut Wicksell and Erik Lindahl made much 
the same suggestion. 
  Public goods and Pigovian subsidies lead naturally to a tax system in which higher-
income individuals pay more in taxes.  Surely, those with higher income and greater property 
benefit more from a governmental system that protects property rights.  Moreover, the monetary 
value attached to other public goods (such as parks and playgrounds) and to positive-externality 
activities (such as basic research) very likely rises with income as well.  Indeed, if the income 
elasticity of demand for these services exceeds one, as is plausible, a progressive tax system is 
perfectly consistent with the Just Deserts Theory. 
  What about transfer payments to the poor?  These can be justified along similar lines.  As 







(Thurow, 1971)  That is, under this view, the government provides for the poor not simply 
because their marginal utility is high but because we have interdependent utility functions.  Put 
differently, we would all like to alleviate poverty.  But because we would prefer to have someone 
else pick up the tab, private charity can’t do the job.  Government-run antipoverty programs 
solve the free-rider problem among the altruistic well-to-do.  
  This perspective can, I believe, potentially resolve the two puzzles I posed earlier.  The 
reason Americans are more ready to vote for transfer payments to the American poor than for 
foreign aid is simply that they care more about their own neighbors than they do about the poor 
abroad.   As a result of these preferences, caring for the American poor is more of a public good 
than caring for the poor in other nations.  This perspective might also explain why most people 
are averse to the idea of a height tax.  If the benefits of government services rise with income, as 
opposed to innate ability, there is no reason to use proxies for ability, such as height, when 
designing a tax system. 
 
A New Set of Questions 
  In the end, I don’t think the Just Deserts Theory necessarily calls for radical changes in 
policy toward taxes and income distribution.  It does, however, suggest that we focus on a 
different set of questions when thinking about policy design.  A utilitarian asks how quickly 
marginal utility falls as income rises and how much people respond to the disincentive effects of 
redistributive tax policy.  A Just Deserts Theorist admits that questions regarding utility 







Rather, he begins by asking whether people’s compensation reflects the contributions they make 
to society and how much they benefit from government actions. 
  There may be no way to decide which of these approaches to tax policy is right, at least 
as judged by the criteria economists usually apply in evaluating theories.  The issue is not one of 
positive economics, so data alone cannot settle the matter.  My guess is that people will have 
different moral intuitions about which approach makes more sense.  It is very possible that if we 
had the opportunity to ask them, Barack Obama and Joe the Plumber would offer different 
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Figure 2: Share of Income Going to the Top 1 Percent 
 
 





























































































Figure 3: Share of Income Going to the Top 0.01 Percent 
 





























































































Federal Taxes as a Percentage of Income 
 
      Average Pretax Income    Effective Federal Tax Rate 
 
Lowest Quintile         $17,200          4.3 % 
Second Quintile           39,400        10.3  
Middle Quintile           60,700        14.2 
Fourth Quintile           89,500        17.6 
Highest Quintile         248,400          25.8 
 
Top  1  percent        1,743,700     31.2 
 
 








Table 2: Optimal Tax Schedules by Height 
 
Source: Mankiw and Weinzeirl (2010). 